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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-THE SEARCH FOR ITS PRINCIPLED Ap
PLICATION TO PREWARRANT EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

The exclusionary rule renders illegally obtained evidence inad
missible at trial.! Its primary purpose is to deter law enforcement au
thorities from implementing investigative procedures that violate
constitutional rights. 2 One result of the rule is that the government
I. The principle of suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence at the trial of an ac
cused had its genesis in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (Where the pur
pose of the government's search and seizure of an accused's private papers is to compel the
accused's testimony in violation of the fifth amendment, such a search and seizure is unrea
sonable and the government is not "entitled to the possession" of the papers.). In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court restated the exclusionary principles ex
pressed in Boyd and suppressed evidence that had been obtained as the result of a search
conducted in violation of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court applied the exclu
sionary rule to state criminal proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp
Court declared that the fourth amendment implicitly requires the suppression of evidence
obtained in contravention of the warrant requirement. Id. at 648. The exclusionary rule
also has been applied to bar an accused's statements which were violative of the accused's
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). In addition, the exclusionary rule has been utilized to suppress an accused's state
ments elicited in violation of the accused's sixth amendment rights. See Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2. While courts and commentators traditionally have advanced several rationales to
justify the exclusionary rule, two have been most prominent. The first rationale is that
suppression of illegally obtained evidence will discourage police from using improper inves
tigatory methods. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665, 668 (1970). The second rationale, termed the "judicial integrity ration
ale," is that suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence distances the courts from constitu
tionally proscribed conduct. See Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 326, 384 A.2d 709, 716
(1978) (suppressing illegally obtained evidence ensures that the judiciary does not become
an accomplice with the police in their willful circumvention of the law, thus preventing the
debasement ofjudicial processes). However, the Supreme Court has noted the "limited role
of this justification." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 450 n.25 (1974) Gudicial integrity rationale does not "provide an independent
basis for excluding challenged evidence."); see generally Schroeder, Deterring Fourth
Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1370-73
(1981).
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often can neither charge nor convict culpable persons due to the inad
missibility of illegally obtained evidence. 3 Courts, aware of this unde
sirable consequence, have fashioned limited exceptions to the rule's
application. 4 These exceptions permit the government to introduce
unlawfully obtained evidence when suppression of the evidence would
not serve the exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale. 5 One exception
is the inevitable discovery doctrine: illegally obtained evidence will be
admissible if the prosecution can prove that in the absence of the mis
conduct, officers would have discovered the evidence lawfully during
the course of a routine and predictable police investigation. 6
Courts have applied the inevitable discovery exception to admit
incriminating physical evidence that officers discover during a war
rantless search in violation of the fourth amendment. 7 Generally,
3. This side effect of the exclusionary rule has been the source of widespread criti
cism. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
378, 388-89 (1964) (The rule's "sole ... justification" is to compel law enforcement authori
ties to comply with constitutional strictures governing police investigative procedures.
Thus, the "rule is a needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease."); Comment, Fruit ofthe Poisonous Tree
A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1137 (1967) ("[A]pplication of the
doctrine of exclusion in any particular case usually means the release of a guilty individual.
This result is wholly undesirable and should be minimized whenever possible."). But see
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recent studies
demonstrate that the "costs" of exclusion are not as significant as popularly imagined),
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984); Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 923-33
(1986).
4. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith exception), reh'g de
nied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978) (attenu
ation exception); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1980) (inevitable
discovery exception); United States v. Brandon, 467 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1972) (independ
ent source exception).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (applica
tion of exclusionary rule exceptions must serve the deterrence principles underlying the
exclusionary rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839 (1981); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 630
(5th Cir. 1974) (when "any deterrent to future illegal police practices from the exclusion of
[allegedly tainted evidence is] slight," then exclusionary rule exceptions should apply), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
6. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (location of victim's remains obtained
through illegal confession was admissible when remains would have been obtained by a
search combing the immediate area); United States ex rei. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d
858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974) (identity and work address of witness listed in a book illegally
seized by the police was not "fruit" of illegality where police possessed independent infor
mation which would have led them to ascertain the witness' identity lawfully); 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 620-28 (1978); LeCount & Girese, The "In
evitable Discovery" Rule. An Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40
ALB. L. REV. 483 (1976); see generally Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (1974).
7. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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there are two warrantless search situations where the inevitable dis
covery rationale has been applied.
In the "hypothetical warrant" situation, officers do not obtain a
search warrant either before or after their unlawful discovery of evi
dence. The government's justification for admitting this evidence is
that the existence of probable cause prior to the unlawful search
proves that a magistrate could have issued a search warrant if re
quested. Most courts refuse to apply the inevitable discovery excep
tion to this situation, reasoning that application of the exception
would not deter unlawful police shortcuts and "would completely ob
viate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."8
In contrast to the hypothetical warrant situation is the prewar
rant search. In· this situation, officers discover incriminating evidence
without a warrant and later seize the evidence with a search warrant.
Therefore, in the prewarrant search situation, there is no need to spec
ulate whether the officers could have obtained the evidence lawfully
because they seize the evidence pursuant to a search warrant.
Lower courts are divided sharply over the appropriateness of ad
mitting prewarrant evidence under an inevitable discovery analysis. 9
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987) (in a "hypothetical war
rant" situation evidence is not admissible because "no independent basis for discovery [is]
established"); United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (It is improper
to admit evidence when the government only "show[s] that it would have gotten a warrant
if it had asked for one."); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744-45 (1st Cir. 1986)
(hypothetical warrant "approach substantially weakens" fourth amendment protection),
petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L. W. 2546 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 85-1534); Commonwealth
v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 219, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981) (improper to admit evidence
obtained during an illegal warrantless search on the theory that it could have been obtained
under a warrant). But see State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (chal
lenged evidence is admissible because "a search warrant could have been obtainable").
9. Federal courts of appeals cases addressing this question are: United States v.
Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987) (inevitable discovery rule applies to adlnit
evidence that officers observed during an unlawful search because they seized this evidence
later pursuant to a valid search warrant); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st
Cir. 1986) (prewarrant evidence is admissible if probable cause is present before the unlaw
ful search), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 2546 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 85-1534);
United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1986) (illegally discovered evidence
admissible when evidence seized later under a valid warrant); United States v. Merri
weather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985) (canister of money observed during an unlawful
search admissible when found later by other officers pursuant to a valid warrant), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir.
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This inconsistency among the courts will soon be resolved by the
United States Supreme Court in Murray v. United States. 10* In Mur
ray, the Supreme Court will determine if the inevitable discovery ex
ception allows the acimission of evidence that police officers observed
in plain view during their unlawful entry into a warehouse and later
seized pursuant to a search warrant. In advance of the Court's resolu
tion of Murray, this comment proposes a framework for the principled
application of the inevitable discovery exception to prewarrant evi
dence and suggests an appropriate analysis for deciding Murray.
Part I of this comment briefly traces the origins and development
of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, culmi
nating in its adoption by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams. I I Part
II analyzes three cases l2 that exemplify the disagreement among
courts over when prewarrant evidence is admissible under an inevita
ble discovery analysis. 13 Finally, Part III proposes an analytical frame
1984) (prewarrant evidence only admissible when "lawful means which made discovery
inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occur
rence of the illegal conduct"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); United States v. Griffin,
502 F.2d 959,961 (6thCir. 1974) (evidence found during an unlawful search suppressed
even though at time of illegality officers were in the process of obtaining a warrant), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1050 {I 974). Among state jurisdictions addressing this question are:
Washington, State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 472-73, 572 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (1978) (en
banc) (prewarrant evidence not admissible under inevitable discovery rationale because no
exigent circumstances justified search without a warrant); and Colorado, People v. Schoon
dermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. App. 1985) (inevitable discovery rule "inapplicable to
rehabilitate evidence" obtained during an unlawful search when evidence seized later under
a valid warrant).
10. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consolidated Murray v.
United States and Carter v. United States with United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589
(1st Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court consolidated Murray and Carter and granted certiorari
in these cases. See Murray, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987). Although the first listed case in the
appeals court opinion is Moscatiello, for purposes of clarity this comment refers to the court
of appeals case as Murray.
* Editor's Note-The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Murray
v. United States on December 8, 1987.
II. 467 U.S. 431 (l984) [Williams II]. See infra notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
There are actually two Williams cases. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) [Wil
liams I], the Supreme Court set aside Williams' conviction for the abduction and murder of
a young girl because Iowa police had obtained the location of the girl's body in violation of
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court, however, reasoned that "evidence of
where the body was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that
the body would have been discovered in any event ...." Id. at 406-07 n.12. In Williams
1/, the prosecution advanced this theory as the basis for admitting the evidence.
12. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d
736 (1st Cir. 1986), petitioll for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 2546 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 85
1534); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050
(1974).
13. See infra notes 60-141 and accompanying text.
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work for resolving this disagreement and suggests an appropriate
resolution for Murray v. United States. 14
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY EXCEPTION

The inevitable discovery exception is the "conceptual" and "hy
pothetical"15 extension of the independent source and attenuation ex
ceptions which the Supreme Court proffered in three cases. 16 In these
cases, the Court not only expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule
to suppress tainted derivative evidence or "fruit of the poisonous
tree,"17 but it also allowed the admission of certain types of illegally
obtained evidence.
In the seminal case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,IS
the Supreme Court carved out the first exception to the exclusionary
rule. The independent source exception allows unlawfully obtained
evidence to be used against an accused when law enforcement officers
14. See infra notes 201-15 and accompanying text.
IS. See LeCount & Girese, supra note 6, at 485-86 ("The 'inevitable discovery' doc
trine constitutes a conceptual extension of [the] ... independent source rationale ....");
Note, Sixth Amendment Inevitable Discovery: A Valuable but Easily Abused Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 733 (1984) ("[T]he inevitable
discovery doctrine extends ... [the] independent source rule and encompasses a hypotheti
cal independent source."); see generally Notes & Comments, Inevitable Discovery: The Hy
pothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule,S HOFSTRA L. REV. 137
(1976) [hereinafter Hypothetical Source].
16. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
17. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as articulated by Justice Frankfurter
in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), applies the exclusionary rule to
evidence derived from illegally obtained "primary" or "direct" evidence. Professor LaFave
describes the operation of the fruit of the poisonous tree or "taint" doctrine as follows:
In the simplest of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cases, the challenged
evidence is quite clearly 'direct' or 'primary' in its relationship to the prior arrest
or search .... Not infrequently ... an illegal search may result in the police
obtaining a confession or a witness who is now prepared to testify against the
defendant, or may uncover facts which lead to an arrest or to another search ....
In these situations, it is necessary to determine whether the derivative evidence is
'tainted' by the prior Fourth Amendment violation.
W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 612; see generally Annotation, "Fruit ofthe Poisonous
Tree" Doctrine Excluding Evidence Derived from Illformation Gained in Illegal Search, 43
A.L.R.3d 385, 389 (1972).
18. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne, corporate officers were not required to obey
government subpoenas which ordered them to provide a grand jury with corporate records
because the subpoenas were based on facts retrieved through an illegal search and seizure.
The Court emphasized, however, that not all facts obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment were "sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an ill
dependent source they may be proved like any others ...." Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
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obtained the evidence through means independent of unlawful
conduct. 19
In Nardone v. United States,2o the Court created the attenuation
exception. Under Nardone, illegally obtained evidence will be admit
ted at trial when the "causal" connection between the misconduct and
the challenged evidence is sufficiently tenuous. 21 When illegally ob
tained evidence is admitted under the attenuation exception it is con
ceded that the evidence can be traced logically to the unlawful police
conduct rather than to an independent, lawful source. Unlawfullyob
tained evidence not admissible under the independent source exception
might, therefore, be admissible under the attenuation rationale. 22
19. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). In Crews, a robbery vic
tim's in-court identification of the accused was admissible even though the identification
was obtained through an illegal arrest. According to the Court, police knowledge of ac
cused's identity and victim's description of her assailant before the arrest provided an in
dependent source for the identification. Id. at 470-73. See also State v. O'Bremski, 70
Wash. 2d 425, 423 P.2d 530 (1967). In O'Bremski, the testimony of a girl whom officers
illegally discovered in a search of the defendant's apartment was admissible against the
defendant under the independent source doctrine. The police, before conducting the illegal
search, possessed independent knowledge through a police informant that the girl was hid
den on the premises. Id. at 429-30, 423 P.2d at 533.
20. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The issue in Nardone was whether information acquired by
the government through illegal wiretaps should be suppressed under the taint doctrine as
fruit of the poisonous tree. In expanding the independent source doctrine, the Court ob
served that "[slophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information
obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good
sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). This case illustrates the
attenuation doctrine in operation. A police officer illegally discovered gambling slips lo
cated in an envelope found on the premises of a business establishment. The police subse
quently informed the FBI of the discovery, although not of the illegal method which was
used to obtain the evidence. Four months later, the FBI interviewed an employee of the
business who was present when the officer conducted the prior illegal search. The em
ployee knew that the gambling slips belonged to one Ceccolini, the owner of the business.
The employee agreed to testify for the government in its prosecution of Ceccolini for per
jury. The Supreme Court reversed an order suppressing the employee's testimony notwith
standing the fact that the testimony could be "logically traced back" to the police officer's
initial illegal search. [d. at 279-80. The Court reasoned that the testimony was attenuated
from the initial illegality. In applying the attenuation doctrine, the Court considered such
factors as the "[sluostantial periods of time" which intervened between the illegal search
and the government's contact with the witness, as well as the truly volitional nature of the
witness' testimony. [d. at 279.
22. Courts have applied the attenuation doctrine extensively to confessions and vol
untary testimony stemming from police misconduct. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978). See also supra note 21. In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the
Court analyzed three factors in determining the degree of attenuation between police mis
conduct and a defendant's confession: (I) the proximity in time between the arrest and the
confession; (2) the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the egregious
ness of the police misconduct involved. [d. at 603-04. For a critical analysis of the attenua
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In Wong Sun v. United States,23 the Court formulated a broad
standard incorporating the "independent source" and "attenuation"
principles espoused in Silverthorne and Nardone. The Court stated:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree"
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evi
dence to which instant objection is made has been come at by ex
ploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. "24

Most courts and commentators agree that the preceding standard also
encompasses the inevitable discovery rationale. 25
Since Judge Learned Hand first articulated the inevitable discov
ery doctrine over forty years ago,26 every United States Circuit Court
of Appeals has applied its rationale to illegally obtained evidence. 27
tion exception to the exclusionary rule, see Comment, The Attenuation Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1984).
23. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, narcotics agents illegally arrested a man
named Toy, who disclosed to them that heroin was secretly in the possession of another
individual named Yee. Yee, in tum, implicated Wong Sun, who subsequently was arrested,
arraigned and released on his own recognizance. Wong Sun later returned and made a
voluntary confession to police. At trial, Wong Sun sought to have this evidence suppressed
as the tainted fruit of Toy's illegal arrest. The Supreme Court applied the attenuation
. doctrine to admit the evidence. The Court reasoned that Wong Sun's voluntary confession
was removed sufficiently from the prior misconduct as to be purged of the taint of that
misconduct. Id.
24. Id. at 487-88 (quoting R. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959».
25. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir.
1974) (independent source test, attenuation test, and inevitable discovery test all evolve
from Wong Sun); Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: What
is Standing in the Way of Supreme Court Adoption?, 16 SUFFOLK u.L. REV. 1043, 1044
(1982) (the Court's analysis in Wong Sun embraces the inevitable discovery exception).
But see Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through its
Exceptions, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 615 (1977). According to that article, the Court in Wong
Sun "spoke in terms of 'whether ... the evidence ... has been come at ... by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint,' not whether the evidence
'could or would have been come at.''' Id. at 626 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
26. See Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943). In Somer, federal
agents unlawfully entered the accused's apartment and discovered an illicit still. Somer's
wife, who was in the apartment at the time, informed the agents that her husband was due
back shortly after delivering the "stuff." Id. at 791. The agents waited outside and arrested
Somer when he arrived home. Although conceding that the liquor found in Somer's car
was "tainted" by the prior unlawful search, Judge Hand reasoned that the liquor would be
admissible if the prosecution could prove that, apart from the illegally obtained disclosures
of Somer's wife, the agents "would have gone to the street, have waited for Somer and have
arrested him, exactly as they did." Id. at 792.
27. The Supreme Court observed in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440 n.2 (1984),
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The doctrine, therefore, has emerged gradually as a valid constitu
tional principle. Despite this acceptance by lower courts, the Supreme
Court did not endorse the inevitable discovery exception to the exclu
sionary rule until 1984. In Nix v. Williams,28 Iowa police were led to
the body of a murdered girl by means of a confession obtained in viola
tion of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel. 29 The Court
held "evidence of the body's location and condition"30 to be admissi
ble since the prosecution could prove by a preponderance of the evi
dence that the body would have been discovered through investigative
procedures independent of the sixth amendment violation. 3) The
prosecution satisfied this burden by showing that a search already in
progress at the time that Williams confessed would have uncovered
the remains had law enforcement officers not obtained the illegal
that every federal circuit had "endorsed" some form of inevitable discovery. See United
States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roper,
681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
881 (1978); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
909 (1975); United States ex reI. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970);
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
Among state jurisdictions which have invoked the inevitable discovery rule are: California,
Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166,474 P.2d 683, 80 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970), and
New York, see People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499,300 N.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1050 (1973).
28. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Williams II was the first case in which the Supreme Court
officially endorsed the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Prior to Wi!- .
Iiams II, two Supreme Court Justices, in dicta, had considered it "a significant constitu
tional question whether the 'independent source' exception to inadmissibility of fruits ...
encompasses a hypothetical as well as an actual independent source." See Fitzpatrick v.
New York, 414 U.S. 1050, 1051 (1973) (White & Douglas, n., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
29. Williams 11,467 U.S. at 431. Police were transporting Williams, a suspect in the
disappearance of a young girl, from Davenport to Des Moines, Iowa, where the girl was
seen last. His attorney was not present. During the drive, a Detective Leamingspoke with
Williams and delivered what is infamously known as the "Christian burial speech":
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road.... [I]t's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visi
bility is poor.... I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where
this little girl's body is.... I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl
who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.
Brewer v. Williams [Williams 1],430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977). Williams, deeply religious
and a former mental patient, directed the detectives to the body. !d.
30. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 441.
31. [d. at 444.
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confession. 32
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,33 reviewed the ra
tionale behind the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule and explored its functional similarity to the independent source
exception. The Court reasoned that because application of the exclu
sionary rule often results in the release of culpable persons, the rule is
justified only for its deterrent effect.34 Consistent with its purpose,
proper application of the rule ensures that the "prosecution is not to
be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality
had transpired."35
The exclusionary rule is applied improperly in cases where sup
pression of evidence would leave the prosecution in a worse position
than it would have been in if there had not been unlawful conduct. 36
The inevitable discovery exception promotes a proper application of
the exclusionary rule because the admission of illegally obtained evi
dence that would have been discovered through independent legal
means ensures that the prosecution is placed in the same, not a worse,
position than if the illegality never had occurred. 37
In applying the inevitable discovery exception, the Court rejected
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' requirement that the prosecution
prove that Detective Learning was not acting in bad faith when he
acted illegally.38 The Court observed that precluding application of
32. Law enforcement officers discovered Williams' abandoned car in Davenport,
Iowa. Id. at 434. They also found articles of clothing belonging to the girl at a rest-stop
between Des Moines and Davenport. Id. at 434-35. Based on these findings, the officers
instituted a large-scale search which combed the woods between Des Moines and the rest
stop where the clothing had been discovered. Id. at 435. This search was in progress when
Detective Learning persuaded Williams to divulge the location of the remains. When Wil
liams agreed to cooperate, the police called off the search. Id. at 436. The detectives found
the body two and one-half miles from where one group of volunteers had been searching at
the time that the police terminated the search. Id.
33. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion
which concurred in the Court's judgment. Justice White filed a concurring opinion in
which he criticized Justice Stevens for his overly critical portrayal of Detective Learning's
conduct. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined.
34. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-43.
35. [d. at 443.
36., Id.
37. Id. at 443-44.
38. [d. at 445-46. The Iowa Supreme Court, in affirming Williams' conviction, con
cluded that there were two prerequisites to introducing evidence under the inevitable dis
covery rule: "(1) the police did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of
the evidence in question, and (2) that the evidence in question would have been discovered
by lawful means." State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979). The court con
cluded that the prosecution had met both requirements. [d. at 260-62. The Court of Ap
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the inevitable discovery exception when police act in bad faith would
withhold from juries highly probative evidence that would have been
available to the prosecution if the unlawful activity had not oc
curred. 39 This would place the prosecution in a worse position than it
would have been, had there been no unlawful conduct. 40
The Court also rejected the argument that application of the inev
itable discovery exception when officers act in bad faith would reduce
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 41 The Court reasoned that
inevitable discovery analysis without an absence of bad faith require
ment would not encourage police misconduct because the police
"rarely, if ever, [will] be in a position to calculate whether the evidence
sought would inevitably be discovered."42 If police were aware that
evidence inevitably would be discovered, they would realize that little
would be accomplished by taking "dubious 'short-cuts' to obtain the
evidence."43 Furthermore, police will avoid following "questionable
practice[s]" because of the threat of interdepartmental disciplinary
sanctions and civi1liability.44
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment of the Court,45 agreed
that the prosecution must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evi
dence that unlawfully obtained evidence would have been discovered
peals for the Eighth Circuit, reviewing Williams' habeas corpus petition reversed, finding
that the State had failed to meet the first criterion. See Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164,
1169-73 (8th Cir. 1983). The cOurt reasoned that "if there is to be an inevitable-discovery
exception the State should not receive its benefit without proving that the police did not act
in bad faith. Otherwise the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the Sixth Amend
ment would be too great, and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule reduced too far."
Id. at 1169 n.5.
39. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 445.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 445-46. For a review of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoning, see
supra note 38.
42. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 445.
43. Id. at 445-46.
44. Id. at 446. The Court was referring to a monetary damage award which would
be available to the defendant when law enforcement agents violate the defendant's constitu
tional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In
Bivens, federal narcotics agents unlawfully entered the defendant's apartment without a
warrant and subsequently arrested him on a narcotics charge. The defendant sought to
resover damages for the unlawful entry. The Court concluded that the defendant had
stated "a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment," and that he was "entitled to
recover money damages for any injuries ... suffered as a result of the agents' violation of
the Amendment." Id. at 397.
45. Justice Stevens, while agreeing that, the majority had applied the inevitable dis
covery rule properly, filed a concurring opinion because he felt that the majority did not
focus its discussion "adequately" upon the magnitude of the constitutional violation that
had occurred. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 451.
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lawfully in the absence of unlawful conduct. 46 He reasoned that "[a]n
inevitable discovery finding is based on objective evidence concerning
the scope of [an] ongoing investigation which can be objectively verified
or impeached."47 Requiring the police to be engaged in an ongoing
investigation occurring simultaneously with the constitutional viola
tion serves to "subject the prosecution's case to ... meaningful adver
sarial testing,"48 without the need to impose upon it an "extraordinary
burden" of proof. In Williams II, the prosecution demonstrated that
at the time of Williams' unlawful interrogation, a search for the girl's
body would have discovered the remains "in the natural and probable
course of events."49
In dissent, Justice Brennan did not question the validity of the
inevitable discovery exception and found the Court's application of the
exception to be "consistent with the requirements of the Constitu
tion."50 However, Justice Brennan disagreed with the evidentiary
standard for demonstrating that evidence would have been discovered
lawfully in the absence of a constitutional violation. In lieu of the
preponderance standard enunciated by the majority,51 Justice Brennan
proposed a clear and convincing standard of proof.52 Justice Brennan
agreed with Justice Stevens that the prosecution should demonstrate
the presence of an ongoing investigation at the time of the misconduct
as a prerequisite to admitting unlawfully obtained evidence under the
inevitable discovery exception. 53
In summary, the Supreme Court articulated four factors which
guided its application of the inevitable discovery exception in Williams
II. First, the Court claimed that suppressing evidence of the location
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 457 n.8.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
49. Id. at 457.
50. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 444.
52. Justice Brennan observed that:
The inevitable discovery exception necessarily implicates a hypothetical finding
that differs in kind from the factual finding that precedes application of the in
dependent source rule. To ensure that this hypothetical finding is narrowly con
fined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent source,
and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule, I
would require clear and convincing evidence before concluding that the govern
ment had met its burden of proof on this issue.
Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
53. Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that "[i]n particular, the Court concludes that un
constitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted at trial if it inevitably would have been
discovered in the same condition by an independent line of investigation that was already
being pursued when the constitutional violation occurred." Id.
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and condition of remains that would have been discovered by the ad
vancing search party was unwarranted; suppression would place the
police in a worse position than they would have been in in the absence
of their misconduct. S4 Second, the government did not have to
demonstrate the absence of bad faith on the part of Detective Learning
as a prerequisite to admitting this evidence. 5s Third, the government
only had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the girl's
remains would have been obtained lawfully. 56 Finally, the govern
ment satisfied this evidentiary burden by showing that a search party
was approaching the location of the remains prior to its unlawful dis
covery by the detectives. 57
II.

PREWARRANT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE

INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION-A DISCUSSION OF
THE RELEVANT CASE LAW

During the 1987 Term, the United States Supreme Court will
hear oral argument in Murray v. United States,58 and will define the
scope of the inevitable discovery exception when applied to prewarrant
evidence. Murray will provide the Court with a second opportunity to
delineate the contours of the inevitable discovery exception. Before
suggesting an appropriate analysis for deciding Murray, this Part ana
lyzes the facts and holdings of three other cases. 59 These cases exem
plify the confusion that exists over how courts should apply the
inevitable discovery exception to prewarrant evidence.

A.United States v. Grifjin
In United States v. Grifjin,60 federal agents developed probable
54.
55.

Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 445.
56. Id. at 444-45 n.5.
57. Id. at 449-50.
58. United States v. Murray, 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1368 (1987). For a review of the facts of Murray, see infra notes 166-77 and accompanying
text.
59. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d
736 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 2546 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 85
1534); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050
(1974).
60. 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974). Griffin was
decided ten years before Williams II. Most courts and commentators cite Griffin approv
ingly as an instance where application of the inevitable discovery exception would be im
permissible. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1981) (the
court of appeals' analysis in Griffin was consistent with the "purposes of the exclusionary
rule"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839 (1981); United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1186 (9th
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cause to search an apartment for narcotics. 61 While one agent was
sent to obtain a search warrant, other agents forcibly entered the
apartment and seized narcotics and drug paraphernalia in plain view.
Four hours after their unlawful entry into the apartment, the agents
confiscated the evidence pursuant to the search warrant. 62
The government attempted to avoid suppression of the evidence
by invoking the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule. 63 The government argued that seizure of the evidence pursuant
to a search warrant, amply supported by probable cause, proved that
the lawful discovery of the evidence "was inevitable without any refer
ence to the illegal entry."64 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected this reasoning. 65 The court held that "[a]bsent 'exigent cir
cumstances,'66 ... police who believe they have probable cause to
search cannot enter a home without a warrant merely because they
Cir. 1980) (court of appeals' analysis in Griffin was appropriate); State v. Dorson, 62 Haw.
377, 383,615 P.2d 740, 745 (1980); State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 259 (Iowa 1979)
(Griffin-like case "provide[s] a clear-cut case for refusal to apply the inevitable discovery
exception"); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 11.4(a), at 624; Appel, The Inevitable Discovery
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, lIS (1985); Hypothetical
Source, supra note IS, at 158-59.
61. Griffin, 502 F.2d at 960.
62. Id.
63. The government argued that the warrantless entry was justified because the
agents reasonably believed that evidence within the apartment could be destroyed or re
moved before they could obtain a warrant. Id. The district court disagreed, observing that
prior surveillance revealed no basis for believing that anyone was present in the apartment.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the government attempted to
admit the evidence under a new theory, the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 961.
66. The exigent circumstances exception is one of the "few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions" to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. See Coo
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347,357 (1967». The rationale behind this exception is that the need for immediate action
outweighs the impracticality of prior resort to a magistrate. The exception, therefore, en
compasses a variety of common situations. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42
43 (1976) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967» (warrantless entry justified by
"hot pursuit" of a felon); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 5 I-52 (1970) (warrantless
search of an automobile justified because of its mobility); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35
(1970) (warrantless entry justified when contraband is "in the process of destruction"). In
Vale, the Supreme Court implied that application of this exception should be limited to
situations where contraband was "in the process of destruction." See id. However, lower
courts have broadened the scope of this exception to situations where there is a threatened
destruction of evidence. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973)
(warrantless search justified when officers "reasonably conclude that the evidence will be
destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant ...."), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
833 (1973). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 6.5, at 432-50; Note, Police Prac
tices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1971).
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plan subsequently to get one ... any other view would tend in actual
practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. "67
Under the exigent circumstances exception to the fourth amend
ment warrant requirement, a warrantless search is lawful if officers
possess probable cause to search for contraband and have a reasonable
basis for believing that the destruction or removal of the contraband is
imminent. 68 The exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale required
suppression of the prewarrant evidence in Griffin because no exigent
circumstances justified the officers' immediate, warrantless entry into
the defendant's apartment. 69 A contrary holding would allow law en
forcement agents, with no reasonable basis for believing that a war
rantless search is justified, to enter and secure premises illegally and
cleanse the taint from their misconduct by subsequently obtaining a
valid warrant. Suppression of prewarrant evidence in Griffin-like
cases, therefore, discourages law enforcement officers' treatment of the
"warrant requirement as merely an ex post facto formality."70
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Griffin is consis
tent with Williams II because Williams II is distinguishable factually.
In Williams II, the prosecution relied upon an independent investiga
tion, entirely unrelated to the unlawful conduct, as the basis for admit
ting the challenged evidence under the inevitable discovery rationale.
Even if Detective Learning had not violated Williams' constitutional
rights, the lawful search party ultimately would have obtained the evi
dence. Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that admission of this evi
dence was proper because the "deterrence rationale ha[d] so little basis
that the evidence should be received."7!
In a Griffin-like case, however, the government cannot base its
inevitable discovery theory upon the existence of an independent in
vestigat~on, unrelated to unlawful conduct. Instead, as one commen
tator observed, admission of evidence in a Griffin-like case "depends,
causally, upon conduct found to be illegal, and the legal and illegal
aspects of the case are inextricably bound in a continuous course of
conduct."72 In a Griffin-like case, officers are asking a court to excuse
67. Griffin, 502 F.2d at 961.
68. See supra note 66.
69. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
70. United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980).
71. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444.
72. See Appel, supra note 60, at 115. During oral argument before the Supreme
Court in Williams II, Mr. Appel, as deputy attorney general of Iowa, represented the peti
tioner State of Iowa. In his article Mr. Appel identifies two "classes of inevitable discov
ery." Id. at 110. In "independent inevitable discovery" cases such as Williams II, law
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their unlawful search because of their subsequent acquisition of a valid
search warrant. 73 Suppression of prewarrant evidence in this type of
case, therefore, discourages law enforcement's circumvention of the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. 74

B.

Segura v. United States
In Segura v. United States,75 New York Drug Enforcement Task

Force agents placed Segura's apartment under surveillance. 76 When
the agents observed Segura entering the lobby of the apartment build
ing, they arrested him and escorted him upstairs. After forcibly enter
ing Segura's apartment without a search warrant, the agents arrested
Segura's friend Colon and three others.77 When the agents moved
from room to room in search of other persons they observed various
"accouterments of drug trafficking."78 Two agents remained in the
enforcement officers are "simultaneously pursuing two totally unrelated lines of investiga
tive activity." Id. at III. Thus, application of the inevitable discovery rule in this context
constitutes a "modest variation" of the independent source rule articulated in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See supra note 18 and accompanying
text. "Dependent inevitable discovery" cases such as Griffin, however, are not character
ized by an "independent avenue of discovery." Appel, supra note 60, at 114-15. Instead,
courts in dependent inevitable discovery cases are "asked to undo the [unlawful] transac
tion, reconstruct it in a legal fashion, and thereby purge the taint from the evidence." Id. at
115.
Interestingly, an illustration of a "dependent inevitable discovery" case can be found
in Williams II. Police officers investigating the disappearance of Pamela Powers searched
Williams' room at the YMCA without a warrant. The next day they seized evidence ob
served during the unlawful search pursuant to a warrant. The petitioner State of Iowa in
its brief distinguished the circumstances surrounding the ultimate discovery of the body
from the prewarrant search and concluded that the prewarrant evidence found in Williams'
room was properly suppressed. See Brief of Petitioner at 16 n.13, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431 (1984) (No. 82-1651).
73. Appel, supra note 60, at 114-15.
74. Id. at 115-16. Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of an "absence of bad faith"
requirement in Williams II, some commentators, without articulating a clear standard for
implementation, have suggested that courts apply a good faith requirement when faced
with a Griffin-like case. See id. at 116 (An absence of bad faith requirement is essential "to
prevent police officers from using ... [a valid warrant] as a bootstrap to introduce evidence
...."); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 11.4(a), at 624 (good faith requirement is necessary
in a Griffin-like case because if "such a short-cut was intentionally taken, the effect would
be to read out of the Fourth Amendment the ~equirement that other, more elaborate and
protective procedures be followed"); Cf Hypothetical Source, supra note 15, at 160 (to
ensure that inevitable discovery doctrine is applied "consistently" with deterrence ration
ale, a showing that "police officers have not acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery"
of evidence is necessary).
75. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
76. Id. at 800.
77. Id. at 800-01.
78. Id. at 801. These items were a triple-beam scale, jars of lactose placed on a
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apartment pending the arrival of a search warrant while their col
leagues drove Segura and his confederates to Drug Enforcement Ad
ministration (DEA) headquarters. Due to "administrative delay," the
agents did not execute a search warrant until nineteen hours after their
unlawful entry.79 During their authorized search of the apartment,
the agents seized other evidence in addition to the items which they
had observed in plain view without the warrant. 80 Segura and Colon
moved to suppress all of the items found in the apartment-the
prewarrant evidence as well as evidence first obtained during the exe
cution of the search warrant. 8 )
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York agreed with the defendants and suppressed all of the evidence
seized by the agents pursuant to the warrant. 82 According to the court,
"no exigent circumstances" justified the agents' warrantless entry into
the apartment. 83 The court further reasoned that all of the evidence
might have been unavailable to the agents had they waited to enter the
apartment lawfully because Colon might have removed or destroyed
the evidence before the agents' authorized search. 84
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the district court properly suppressed the prewarrant evidence. 8s
The court claimed that the agents impermissibly had created an exi
gency to justify their unlawful intrusion into the apartment. 86 The
court of appeals, however, reversed the suppression of the postwarrant
evidence. The court observed that Second Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent supported its holding that evidence first discovered pursuant
to a valid warrant should not be suppressed even when the lawful dis
covery of the evidence is preceded by an unlawful, warrantless entry. 87
bedroom table as well as several cellophane bags in a bedroom closet. United States v.
Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1981).
79. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801. The government conceded that the nineteen hour delay
was unreasonable. Its "only explanation" for the delay was that the agents spent most of
the day following the entry processing the defendants' arrests. See id. at 825 n.17.
80. Id. at 801. The agents, during their second search, obtained approximately three
pounds of cocaine, ammunition for a handgun, records of narcotics transactions and
$50,000 in cash. Id.
8!. Id.
82. Id. at 801-02.
83. Id. at 802.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd. 468 U.S. 796
(1984).
86. Id. at 417.
87. Id. at 414-15. The court relied on its reasoning in United States v. Agapito, 620
F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980). In Agapito, following a two day
surveillance of a hotel room, federal agents arrested the defendants while they were in the
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The court also dismissed as "speculative" and "prudentially unsound"
the district court's assertion that all of the evidence in the apartment
might have been destroyed or removed had the unlawful search not
occurred. 88
After their convictions were affirmed, Segura and Colon peti
tioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The government did
not appeal the portion of the court of appeals' opinion suppressing the
prewarrant evidence. 89
The Supreme Court90 affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Ap
peals decision admitting the postwarrant evidence. The majority rea
soned that the search warrant provided an independent, untainted
source for this evidence because the warrant was based upon informa
tion known by the agents prior to their warrantless entry.91 The ma
jority also agreed with the court of appeals and dismissed as
"speculative" and "prudentially unsound" the district court's asser
hotel lobby. The agents then entered the defendants' hotel room without a warrant and
seized a suitcase. Pursuant to a warrant executed 24 hours after the illegal entry, the agents
discovered cocaine in the suitcase. Id. at 328. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the cocaine was admissible, notwithstanding the illegal entry and the 24 hour
delay in obtaining a warrant, because the search warrant was valid. See id. at 338.
88. Segura, 663 F.2d at 416-17.
89. Segura, 468 U.S. at 802-03 n.4.
90. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. However, only Justice O'Connor joined Chief
Justice Burger on Part IV of the opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined.
91. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814. The majority observed that under Silverthorne Lumber
and its progeny, courts should not suppress unlawfully obtained evidence "unless the ille
gality is at least the 'but for' cause of the discovery of the evidence." Id. at 814-15. Here,
the "but for" requirement was not satisfied because "[t]he illegal entry ... did not contrib
ute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant." Id. at 815.
The Court also observed that its holding was "consistent with the vast majority of
Federal Courts of Appeals" that have addressed this question. Id. at 814 n.9. Among the
cases that the Court cited were United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 945 (6th Cir. 1981)
(search pursuant to a valid warrant is constitutional even when preceded by an unlawful
search), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981), and United States V. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980). See supra note 87. The Court noted, how
ever, that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held "otherwise." Segura, 468 U.S. at
814 n.9. See. e.g., United States V. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1983) (valid
warrant based upon independent source rationale cannot cure prior unconstitutional
seizure), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984).
The Court addressed another question, in addition to the independent source or
"taint" issue: whether the agents' impoundment of the apartment was reasonable under
the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned that assuming the impoundment of the apart
ment constituted a seizure of its contents, the seizure was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Segura, 468 U.S. at 798. For a discussion of this aspect of the Court's hold
ing. see Recent Developments, The Securing of the Premises Exception: A Search for the
Proper Balance, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1589, 1606-11 (I985).
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tion that all of the evidence in the apartment might have been unavail
able to the agents had they waited to enter the apartment lawfully.
The majority was unwilling to "def[y] both logic and common sense
[by endorsing a] 'constitutional right' to destroy evidence."92
Throughout its opinion, the majority stressed that it was only de
ciding the precise question of whether a warrantless entry by officers
taints evidence that they first discover pursuant to a valid search war
rant obtained after their allegedly unlawful entry.93 However, in a
part of the opinion in which only two Justices joined,94 the majority
implied that the court of appeals properly suppressed the prewarrant
evidence. According to the Court, the illegal "entry may have consti
tuted an illegal search . . . requiring suppression of all evidence ob
served during the entry."95 Later, the Court observed that admitting
the postwarrant evidence in Segura would not create an incentive for
unlawful entries because "officers who enter illegally will recognize
that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry
may be suppressed."96 The Court also repeated the assertion it made
in Williams II that the prospect of civi1liability provided an additional
deterrent to illegal conduct. 97
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, decried the "blatant un
constitutionality" of the illegal entry into, and impoundment of, the
apartment. 98 He reasoned that because the exclusionary rule's "prin
ciple purpose" is to deter fourth amendment violations,99 the admissi
bility of the postwarrant evidence in Segura should not depend solely
upon the outcome of a strict causation analysis. loo He stressed that
"exclusion [of evidence]. is required to remove the incentive for the
police to engage in the unlawful conduct."101
Justice Stevens then critically examined the majority's approach
and noted its "analytical difficulties."102 He reasoned that if the
search warrant provided an " 'independent' source" for the postwar
92. Segura, 468 U.S. at 816.
93. Id. at 798, 802-03 n.4, 804.
94. Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger in Part IV of the opinion which
addressed the "reasonableness" of the impoundment. Id. at 805-13.
95. Segura, 468 U.S. at 811.
96. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens viewed the impoundment of
the apartment as both an unlawful search and seizure because of its 18-20 hour duration.
Id. at 824-25.
99. Id. at 828.
100. Id.. at 830.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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rant evidence, it would be incongruous to admit this evidence while
excluding the items which the agents observed in plain view during
their unlawful entry. In this case, "[t]he warrant provided an 'in
dependent' justification for seizing all the evidence in the apartment
that in plain view just as much as the items that were concealed."103
The dissent further observed that although the search warrant
was based upon lawfully obtained information, this fact by itself
should not have been dispositive of the petitioners' claims:
The Court states that the fruits of the judicially authorized search
were untainted because "[n]o information obtained during the ini
tial entry or occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the
agents to secure the warrant ...." That is sufficient to dispose only
of a claim that petitioners do not make-that the information which
led to the issuance of the search warrant was tainted. It does not
dispose of the claim that petitioners do make-that the agents' ac
cess to the fruits of the authorized search, rather than the informa
tion which led to that search, was a product of illegal conduct. 104

The dissent concluded that the exclusionary rule's deterrence ra
tionale required the suppression of all the evidence which the officers
obtained through their unconstitutional conduct absent a finding "that
the evidence in fact would have remained in the apartment had it not
been unlawfully impounded." 105 Because there was substantial doubt
as to whether all of the evidence would have been discovered had the
unlawful entry into and impoundment of the apartment not occurred,
the dissent would have remanded the case to the district court for fur
ther consideration of this question. 106
Segura is inconsistent with Williams II in several respects. For
example, in Segura, some if not all of the evidence might have been
removed or destroyed before the acquisition of the search warrant had
the officers not entered the apartment illegally. Thus, by upholding
103. Id. at 831.
104. Id. at 831-32. Justice Stevens stressed that "[t]he element of access, rather than
information, is central to virtually the whole of our jurisprudence under ... the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 833 n.27. He continued:
In all of our cases suppressing evidence because it was obtained pursuant to a
warrantless search, we have focused not on the authorities' lack of appropriate
information to authorize the search, but rather on the fact that that information
was not presented to a magistrate. Thus, suppression is the consequence not of a
lack of information, but of the fact that the authorities' access to the evidence in
question was not properly authorized and hence was unconstitutional.
/d.
105. Id. at 836-38.
106. Id. at 837-38.
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the admission of the postwarrant evidence, the Court may have placed
the prosecution in a better position than they would have been had
police misconduct not occurred, a result plainly contrary to its pro
nouncement in WilliamsII.107
Segura is also inconsistent with Williams II because of the
Court's refusal in Segura to admit the prewarrant evidence. Admission
of this evidence could have been based on either one of two theories
an independent source theory, as Justice Stevens suggested,108 or an
"inevitable discovery" theory, as advocated by the COlJrt of Appeals
for the First Circuit. 109 .If based on the latter theory,· then admission
of this evidence seemingly was required by Williams II once the Court
held that the valid search warrant provided an independent source for
the postwarrant evidence. The agents "inevitably" obtained the
prewarrant evidence through an independent, lawful source after seiz
ing this evidence unlawfully.IJO
In sum, the Supreme Court held that the search warrant, issued
upon lawfully obtained information, provided an independent source
107. See supra text accompanying note 35.
108. Justice Stevens questioned whether there was any principled reason for distin
guishing between the prewarrant and postwarrant evidence for purposes of applying the
Court's independent source analysis: "If the execution of a valid warrant takes the poison
out of the hidden fruit, I should think that it would also remove the taint from the fruit in
plain view." Segura, 468 U.S. at 83 J. See supra text accompanying note 103.
109. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 2546 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 85-1534). See infra notes 111-38. In the
wake of Segura, there is a certain amount of confusion over when prewarrant evidence can
be admitted under an independent source or inevitable discovery theory. In Silvestri, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit attempted to clarify this largely semantic distinction.
Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 739. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26. The court reasoned
that the independent source exception applies to admit prewarrant evidence when this evi
dence "can be considered to be cleanly 'rediscovered' when the warrant is executed."
Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 739. The court recalled that it had applied the independent source
rationale to admit prewarrant evidence in United States v. Murray, 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir.
1985), because the evidence in that case was cleanly rediscovered pursuant to a valid war
rant. Id. at 602. For a review of the facts of Murray and the First Circuit Court of Appeals
analysis in that case see infra notes 166-200. In Murray, officers entered a warehouse with
out a warrant, observed incriminating evidence, and retreated, securing the building from
the outside pending the arrival of a warrant. Murray, 771 F.2d at 595.
The court held that prewarrant evidence is admissible under an inevitable discovery
analysis when officers observe this evidence during an illegal search but continue to assert
control over the evidence by securing the premises. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 740. In these
cases the evidence is seized unlawfully and a search warrant does not effectuate a lawful
seizure of this evidence pursuant to the independent source rationale. Id. However, this
analysis suggests that Murray is not an "independent source" case but an "inevitable dis
covery" case because the officers observed the evidence illegally and then asserted control
over the evidence by securing the premises. Murray, 771 F.2d at 595.
110. See Williams II, 467 U.S. at 443-44 (noting "functional similarity" of independ
ent source and inevitable discovery doctrines).
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for the postwarrant evidence. However, the Court did not apply the
logic of this analysis to admit the prewarrant evidence. The Court,
therefore, left for another day the question of whether a valid search
warrant vel non can be the basis for admitting prewarrant evidence
under either an independent source or inevitable discovery theory.
C.

United States v. Silvestri

In United States v. Silvestri, III the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit asserted that a valid search warrant provides the basis for ad
mitting prewarrant evidence under an inevitable discovery analysis,
thus accepting a proposition which the Supreme Court refused to en
dorse in Segura.
In Silvestri, New Hampshire state police, without a warrant, en
tered and secured property owned by Frederick Silvestri, Sr. 112 Ser
geant DuBois of the New Hampshire state police asked Silvestri for
the keys to his garage and Silvestri complied. Inside the garage Ser
geant DuBois observed "many bales of marijuana and blocks of hash
ish."113 Sergeant DuBois immediately reported his finding to the New
Hampshire State Police Barracks in Epping, New Hampshire. The
police arrived with a warrant eight hours later and the officers seized
ninety-nine bales of marijuana, 1489 pounds of hashish and several
incriminating documents. 114
At trial, Silvestri moved to suppress all of the evidence which the
officers seized pursuant to the warrant. I 15 The district court conceded
that the officers' entry upon Silvestri's property was "illegal and inex
cusable."116 However, it refused to suppress the evidence, reasoning
that the search warrant was valid because it was based upon probable
III. 787 F.2d 736 (1st CiT. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 2546 (U.S.
June 2, 1986) (No. 85-1534).
112. Id. at 737.
113. Id. at 737-38.
114. Id. at 738.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Curry, 751 F.2d 442, 447 (1st Cir. 1984». Silvestri
was the second time the court of appeals addressed the legality of the police entry into
Silvestri's premises. In United States v. Curry, 751 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1984), the court held
that while the entry clearly was unlawful, all evidence obtained under the valid warrant
was admissible in light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Segura. The court, then, re
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the officers observed any of the
evidence in plain view before the arrival of the warrant. Id. at 449. See infra notes 117-19
and accompanying text.
In Silvestri, the court of appeals determined whether evidence seen before the arrival of
the valid search warrant was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. See infra
text accompanying notes 123-26.
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cause 'existing before the entry. 117
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the Supreme Court's analysis in Segura required the admission of all
evidence first seized under the valid warrant.ll8 Because the Supreme
Court in Segura had not considered the admissibility of evidence ob
served in plain view before the arrival of a search warrant, the court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine if the
officers had seen any of the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant before the warrant was obtained. 119
On remand, the district court determined that Sergeant DuBois
had observed the bales of marijuana and hashish before the arrival of
the search warrant and that this evidence was not in plain view. 120
The district court ruled that the prewarrant evidence was admissible
under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule be
cause the police' obtained the evidence pursuant to the valid warrant
and officers had been preparing an application for the warrant when
Sergeant DuBois observed the evidence,l21
In its second review of the case, the court of appeals found no
evidence supporting the district court's finding that officers had initi
ated the warrant application process before the unlawful seizure of the
evidence. 122 The court of appeals nevertheless held the prewarrant ev
idence to be admissible, claiming that there was no "necessary require
ment that the warrant application process have already been initiated"
when Sergeant DuBois observed the narcotics. 123
117. Curry, 751 F.2d at 447.
118. Id. at 448.
119. Id. at 449.
120. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 738.
121. Id. (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984».
122. Id. at 742. The court of appeals reasoned that Sergeant DuBois' observation of
the narcotics in Silvestri's garage constituted an unlawful seizure of that evidence. Id. at
741. According to the court, "The conjunction of observation of specific objects and the
assertion of control over those objects via the 'securing' of the property sufficiently affects
[an individual's] possessory interests in those particular objects ...." Id. at 740. There
fore, the later arrival of a warrant "does not effect a legal seizure" of evidence observed
unlawfully. Id. The court then examined the record to determine if officers had com
menced the warrant application process before Sergeant DuBois' unlawful seizure of the
narcotics in Silvestri's garage. The court determined that the unlawful seizure occurred
between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. Id. at 741. At this time, the only officers who possessed the
information necessary to draft the warrant application were in transit between Leominster,
Massachusetts, and the New Hampshire state police barracks in Epping. These officers
began preparing the search warrant at 6:00 a.m., two hours after the unlawful seizure of the
evidence. Therefore, the court found that the warrant process had not commenced before
the unlawful seizure of the narcotics. Id. at 741-42.
123. Id. at 746.
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In its analysis, the court of appeals observed that admissibility of
the prewarrant evidence in Silvestri depended upon an application of
the inevitable discovery exception and not the independent source doc
trine. According to the court, the Supreme Court properly admitted
the postwarrant evidence in Segura under the independent source ex
ception because the illegal entry into and impoundment of the apart
ment did not amount to an unlawful "seizure of the unobserved
objects contained within the premises."124 However, in a case like
Silvestri, where evidence is observed during an illegal entry, the evi
dence is seized illegally at the moment that the officers view it and
assert control over the premises. Thus, the later acquisition of a valid
warrant does not effectuate a lawful seizure of this evidence pursuant
to the independent source rationale. 125 The court of appeals con
cluded that "[t]he question in this kind of situation must be .
whether the evidence inevitably would have been seized by an in
dependent legal means."126
The court then observed that when the Supreme Court endorsed
the inevitable discovery exception in Williams II, it had not estab
lished an "active pursuit" of lawful means requirement. 127 Instead,
the Supreme Court "concluded only that the inevitability of the dis
covery [of the victim's body] was demonstrated by the ongoing nature
of the search and the progress it had already made."128 The court of
appeals noted that other courts had required that "the legal process of
discovery must be ongoing" before the occurrence of unlawful conduct
as a prerequisite to admitting evidence under an inevitable discovery
analysis. 129 However, the court reasoned that applying this reqUlre
124. Id. at 739 (citing Segura, 468 U.S. at 811).
125. Id. at 740.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 742.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 742-44. The court cited five cases in which federal courts of appeals,
applying the inevitable discovery rule, required a showing that ongoing, independent inves
tigations would have obtained tainted evidence in the absence of police misconduct. See
United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 152 (10th Cir. 1986) (inevitable discovery rule only
applies where an independent investigation would have obtained evidence lawfully); United
States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1206 (5th Cir. 1985) (evidence obtained during an unlaw
ful search suppressed because "[n]o finding was made ... [that officers] were actively
pursuing a warranted means of" obtaining the evidence when misconduct occurred), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 932 (1987); United States V. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir.
1984) (prewarrant evidence admissible when police, before illegal search, possessed a war
rant and were "actively pursuing" these lawful means), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985);
United States V. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cir. 1983) (suggesting that inevitable
discovery exception only applies when lawful means of discovery were ongoing when un
lawful conduct occurred); United States V. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982)
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ment in prewarrant search cases would be inappropriate.
According to the court, an "active pursuit requirement" in a case
such as Williams II or an unlawful search case where a warrant is
never obtained, is necessary to demonstrate the inevitability of the
lawful discovery of evidence po However, this requirement is unnec
essary in prewarrant search situations because "[t]he fact that a war
rant has been obtained removes speculation as to whether a magistrate
would in fact have issued a warrant on the facts ...."131
The court of appeals conceded that "other concerns rise to the
fore.... where a warrant is only sought after an illegal search reveals
evidence of criminal activity .... "132 The obvious concern was the
possibility that evidence obtained during the illegal search might have
influenced the decision to obtain a search warrant. 133 The court ob
served that a requirement that the police be in the process of applying
for a warrant prior to the illegal discovery of the evidence ensures that
the warrant is based upon preexisting probable cause. 134 However, the
court reasoned that conditioning the admissibility of prewarrant evi
dence solely upon this requirement was an inflexible "bright-line" ap
proach: "Most of the time, if the police are already in possession of,
probable cause for the warrant, a gap between the illegal discovery and
the initiation of the warrant will be due to various practical problems
entirely unrelated to a decision to seek a warrant."135 The court ob
served that in Silvestri, the delay in applying for the warrant was due
to such a problem. 136
The court, there~ore, concluded that in prewarrant search situa
tions "there is no necessary requirement that the warrant application
process have already been initiated at the time" an unlawful search
occurs.137 Instead, prewarrant evidence is admissible under an inevi
table discovery analysis when the warrant that officers obtain after an
illegal search is based upon valid probable cause. 138
(unlawfully obtained evidence admissible when evidence "would have been discovered .. ;
through a lawful investigation already underway. ").
130. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 746.
131. Id. at 745.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. "[T]he delay between the search of the garage and the time that ... [the
officers] initiated the warrant process was clearly attributable to the time it took the two
officers to complete their duties in Massachusetts and drive back to New Hampshire." Id.
137. Id. at 746.
138. Id.

1988]

INEVITABLE DISCOVER Y AND PREWARRANT EVIDENCE

83

The First Circuit Court of Appeals' approach in Silvestri and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Griffin exemplify two con
trasting views concerning the appropriateness of admitting prewarrant
evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine. In Griffin, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, by focusing its analysis upon the con
duct of the officers who had acted illegally, properly adopted an ap
proach that was consistent with the exclusionary rule's deterrence
rationale. The purpose behind the court's decision to suppress the
prewarrant evidence in Griffin was to discourage law enforcement of
ficers from engaging in unjustified circumventions of the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement.
In Silvestri, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did not
focus its analysis upon the deterrence factor. Instead, this court
mechanically applied the logic of the majority's reasoning in Segura to
admit prewarrant evidence on the basis of a valid, later-acquired,
search warrant.
There are two reasons why courts should not admit prewarrant
evidence solely upon this basis. First, language in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Segura suggests that courts should suppress physi
cal evidence observed during an unlawful search even when this evi
dence is seized later pursuant to a valid search warrant. 139 The Court
in Segura reasoned that suppressing prewarrant evidence serves the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule because it discourages un
lawful entries and impoundments. l40
Second, a determination that a search warrant is based upon in
formation unrelated to an earlier illegal search shows that the officers
who acted illegally could have acted lawfully and obtained the valid
warrant before their search. The approach which the First Circuit
Court of Appeals adopts is inimical to the exclusionary rule's deter
rence rationale because these officers would know that they.could con
duct illegal warrantless entries and any evidence that they find would
be admissible if they subsequently obtain a valid search warrant. With
this invitation to conduct objectively unreasonable searches, officers
might well decide to pursue an improper course of conduct, as they
did in Griffin and Segura, to lessen any likelihood that incriminating
evidence would be removed or destroyed. They also would be able to
139. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
140. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810-12 (1984). Professor LaFave, how
ever, characterizes this language in Segura's majority opinion as "a brief bow" to the exclu
sionary rule's deterrence rationale. See 3 W. LAFA VE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 349 (Supp.
1986). He argues that the logic of the Court's independent source analysis makes it "rela
tively easy" for it to admit prewarrant evidence in a future case. Id.
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"confirm" the existence of incriminating evidence to determine
whether it is even necessary to apply for a warrant.141
III.

A SUGGESTED ApPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE

ADMISSIBILITY OF PREWARRANT EVIDENCE AND ITS
ApPLICATION TO MURRAY V. UNITED STATES

The preceding discussion has shown the impropriety of an inevi
table discovery approach which allows the admission of prewarrant
evidence merely because the officers who act illegally subsequently ob
tain a valid search warrant. In lieu of such an approach, courts should
look to Williams II for guidance and admit prewarrant evidence only
when the government bases its inevitable discovery theory upon an
independent investigation, totally unrelated to unlawful conduct. 142
The difficulty of proving the existence of an alternative line of investi
gation would discourage officers from attempting to use the inevitable
141. In "confirming" search cases, officers with probable cause are not motivated by
a desire to preserve incriminating evidence. Instead, these searches are undertaken by of
ficers to determine whether obtaining a warrant is necessary.
In Krauss v. Superior Court,S Cal. 3d 418, 487 P.2d 1023, 96 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971),
the California Supreme Court held that an officer's illegal confirming search and discovery
of incriminating evidence did not require the suppression of that evidence when it was
seized later by the same officer pursuant to a valid warrant. Justice Peters, writing for the
dissent, criticized this result:
[T]he search-unlawfully-first-obtain-the-warrant-Iater procedure would totally
undermine the purposes of the exclusionary rule. By holding that a search war- .
rant subsequently obtained on the basis of probable cause insulates the prior un
lawful search, the majority provide profit for the unlawful search, thus violating
the principle of deterrence on which the exclusionary rule is based ... we may
expect that many officers wi\l engage in unlawful searches . . . to determine
whether their information is correct or not before seeking a warrant.
Id. at 426, 487 P.2d at 1029,96 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Peters, J., dissenting). Later, in People v.
Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978), the California Supreme
Court endorsed Justice Peters' reasoning and overruled Krauss. For a discussion of the
confirming search practice see 3 W. LAFA VE, supra note 6, § 11.4(a), at 344-45, 349-50
(Supp. 1986).
142. The majority opinion in Williams II did not include language limiting applica
tion of the inevitable discovery exception to situations where unlawfully obtained evidence
would have been obtained through an independent investigation unrelated to unlawful con
duct. However, Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan seemed to accept this limitation. For
example, Justice Stevens observed that "[a]n inevitable discovery finding is based on objec
tive evidence concerning the scope of the ongoing investigation which can be objectively
verified or impeached." Williams II, 467 U.S. at 457 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, noting the exception's "compatib[ility) with the Constitution," rea·
soned that evidence admissible under an inevitable discovery analysis "would have been
discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed." Id.
at 459 (emphasis added) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Appel, supra note 60, at
120 (The concurring and dissenting opinions in Williams II suggest that inevitable discov
ery "exception should be limited to independent inevitable discovery contexts. ").
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discovery exception as a "bootstrap to introduce evidence."143 This
requirement, therefore, would provide officers with an incentive to
comply with the fourth amendment's mandate that they obtain a war
rant before undertaking a search. This comment now reviews the facts
of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case which illustrates an appli
cation of Williams II's independent investigation principle in the
prewarrant search context.
A.

The Independent Investigation Requirement
In United States v. Salgado, 144 federal agents arrested Salgado one

half hour after engaging him in a sham narcotics transaction. During
a search of his person they obtained information leading them to sus
pect that narcotics and other incriminating evidence were located at a
nearby apartment. 145 The agents, without a search warrant, entered
the apartment and conducted a limited security check during which
they observed various items of incriminating evidence. 146 They then
sealed the apartment from the outside pending the arrival of a war
rant. Four hours later, another team of officers seized the evidence
that was observed in plain view during the warrantless entry and
seized additional evidence pursuant to a valid search warrant. 147 Sal
gado moved to suppress all of the items seized from the apartment.
The district court denied this motion and Salgado appealed to the Sev
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. 148
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding, stating
that Segura permitted the admission of evidence which the officers first
obtained pursuant to the warrant during the second search of Sal
gado's apartment. 149 The court then dismissed Salgado's contention
that Segura required the suppression of evidence which the other of
ficers originally discovered in plain view during their security check.
The court observed that in Segura "[t]he issue of the admissibility of
the 'seen' items was not before the Supreme Court ...."150 Further
more, according to the court, the passage in Segura suggesting that
143. Appel, supra note 60, at 116.
144. 807 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1986).
145. Id. at 605. During their search of Salgado, the agents obtained a receipt from a
lock company indicating that the company had rekeyed the door to an apartment located at
2580 West Golf Road. According to the receipt, Salgado resided at this apartment. Id.
146. Id. at 605-06.
147. Id. at 606. The warrant was based upon information "describing the circum
stances" surrounding the arrests of Salgado and an associate, Bernal. Id.
148. Id. at 604.
149. Id. at 606-10.
ISO. Id. at 608.
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courts should suppress prewarrant evidence was "dictum" and ap
peared "in a part of the opinion that only two members of the Court
joined .... "151
The court of appeals also observed that the Supreme Court's rea
soning in Williams II 152 supported admission of the prewarrant evi
dence in Salgado. 153 The court of appeals noted that "a different
group of officers" had seized the evidence pursuant to a valid warrant
after the allegedly unlawful search. 154 The court then implicitly noted
Salgado's factual similarity with Williams II:
Suppose one team of officers seizes a piece of evidence illegally for
which another team has already obtained, but not yet executed, a
lawful search warrant-which is one way to describe the present
case.... There would be no closer causal relationship between the
initial search and the introduction of evidence at trial than in a case
where the police have two independent sources of information re
garding the location of a corpse, one source having been coerced
illegally, the other being lawful; evidence of the location, having an
independent untainted source, would be admissible. 155

Although it is unclear whether the magistrate, in fact, issued the
warrant before the unlawful search, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap
peals' decision to admit the prewarrant evidence in Salgado neverthe
less seems consistent with Williams II. If the government in Salgado
could establish that the officers who obtained the valid warrant neither
authorized the previous search, nor acted in collusion with the officers
who conducted that search, then Salgado, in the prewarrant search
context, would be closely analogous to Williams II. The officers exe
cuting the search warrant constituted an "independent line of investi
gation"IS6 entirely unrelated to the unlawful conduct, and they seized
the evidence after the unlawful search of Salgado's apartment. IS7
151.

Id.

152. For a discussion of Williams II, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), see supra notes 28-57 and
accompanying text.
153. Salgado, 807 F.2d at 608.
154. /d. at 607.
155. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
156. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed the view that the inevitable
discovery exception only applies when unlawfully obtained evidence would have been dis
covered through an investigation, independent of unlawful conduct. See United States v.
Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986). In Owens, police officers without a search warrant
searched the defendant's hotel room and discovered incriminating evidence. The officers
never obtained a warrant after their search. The court refused to apply the inevitable dis
covery exception to admit the evidence, reasoning that "[alII the cases that have endorsed
the inevitable discovery exception have relied upon independent, untainted investigations
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However, the later seizure of the evidence by another team of
officers would not, in every case, prove that prewarrant evidence is the
"ultimate" product of an independent and untainted investigation.
For example, if in Salgado the officers who obtained and executed the
lawful search warrant had also ordered the unlawful, prewarrant en
~ry, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit would not have been
faced with two analytically distinct avenues of conduct. Instead, such
a case would factually resemble Griffin, where prewarrant evidence is
essentially the product of a single course of unlawful conduct.
In illegal, prewarrant search cases where the government cannot
base its inevitable discovery theory upon an independent investigation
unrelated to unlawful conduct, the exclusionary rule's deterrence ra
tionale requires the suppression of prewarrant evidence. A judicial de
termination that a warrantless search is unlawful means that the
officers who conducted that search acted unreasonably.ls8 If officers
could purge the taint from physical evidence observed during an un
that would have inevitably uncovered the same evidence." Id. at 152. But see United
States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987).
In a case that is similar factually to Owens, Justice Kennedy, at the time writing for
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, observed that "[the] existence of two independent
investigations at the time of discovery is not ... a necessary predicate to the inevitable
discovery exception." Id. at 864. Reasoning that the inevitable discovery exception is best
developed on a case-by-case basis, he stressed that it at least must be shown "that the fact
or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other than those
disclosed by the illegal search itself." Id. at 864-65. Justice Kennedy concluded that the
inevitable discovery exception was inapplicable in Boatwright because the government
failed to show that an "independent search occurred or was likely to occur at any point."
Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
Although Justice Kennedy rejected an "independent investigation" restriction to inevi
table discovery, he also rejected any approach which would permit officers "to ignore
search requirements at any convenient point ...." Id.
158. Under the exigent circumstances exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, the legality of a warrantless search depends upon whether the officers' deci
sion to conduct a warrantless search is objectively reasonable. For a discussion of prior
cases defining the limits of this exception, see supra note 66. See United States v. Rubin,
474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973) (warrantless search is lawful when "based on the sur
rounding circumstances ... [the officers] reasonably conclude that the evidence will be
destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant ....") (emphasis added).
In some cases, a subsequent determination that the warrantless search, in fact, was
unjustified does not render the search unlawful, provided that the officers acted reasonably
under the circumstances. See, e.g., Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982). In
Archibald, officers responded to a robbery call and were informed by the victim that he had
chased the robber into a nearby apartment. When the officers and the robbery victim went
to the apartment they heard noise sounding "like furniture being moved inside." Id. at 6.
When no one responded to their requests to enter, the officers forcibly entered the apart
ment and discovered a frightened child. Id. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that the entry was lawful because "a reasonable percep
tion of exigent circumstances" justified the entry. Id. at 7.
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lawful search by simply obtaining a valid warrant after the fact, they
would know that they could act unreasonably and still ensure the ad
mission of incriminating evidence. When a compelling opportunity
arises, officers might be more likely to choose an illegal and expedient
route to incriminating evidence to ensure its preservation, and cleanse
their conduct later by obtaining a valid warrant. Suppressing prewar
rant evidence in these circumstances would compel officers to conform
their conduct to a standard of reasonableness, and therefore would
discourage "confirming"'59 searches and the type of egregious miscon
duct that occurred in Griffin and Segura.
Arguably, the threat of interdepartmental disciplinary sanctions
and civil liability provides an additional deterrent to unreasonable,
prewarrant searches. However, there is no indication that the
Supreme Court is prepared to use this fact as a basis for refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule to situations where its application tradi
tionally has been appropriate. Indeed, suppression of physical evi
dence observed during an illegal prewarrant search is consistent with
the Court's current posture regarding the exclusionary rule's proper
scope. For example, in United States v. Leon 160 the Court observed
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful searches
and seizures. '61 The Court then concluded that this purpose is not
furthered by suppressing evidence that officers obtain illegally when
they rely in objective good faith upon a defective warrant issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate. '62
Although the Court carefully limited its application of this "good
faith exception" to Leon's factual context, the rationale used to justify
adoption of the exception was not so limited. 163 The Court broadly
159. See supra note 14l.
160. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). Leon has been the
subject of extensive commentary. See. e.g., Alschu1er, "Close Enough for Government
Work':' The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 SUP. Cr. REV. 309; Dripps, Living With
Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); LaFave, "The Seductive Call ofExpediency": United States
v. Leon. Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895; Leading Cases of the
1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 108 (1984); Note, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule Under the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Leon and Massachusetts
v. Sheppard, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 977 (1985); Note, United States v. Leon: The Court
Redefines the Right to the Exclusionary Remedy, 16 U. ToL. L. REV. 345 (1984).
For a discussion of the origins of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and
its development before Leon, see LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World:
On Drawing "Bright Lines"and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 337-59 (1982).
161. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
162. Id. at 922.
163. Indeed, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Leon, expressed concern about extending
the good faith exception to other contexts:
[A]lthough the Court's decisions are clearly limited to the situation in which po
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stated that the exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale is not served
"when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief
that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment."164 Con
versely, the Court's analysis in Leon suggests that courts should sup
press physical evidence observed in illegal, prewarrant searches
because such searches necessarily are objectively unreasonable. 165
Suppression of the evidence therefore would deter similar unreasona
ble conduct.
In light of the preceding discussion, this comment now considers
the facts of Murray v. United States and determines whether the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit properly admitted the prewarrant evi
dence at issue in that case.

B. Murray v. United States 166
In connection with their investigation of an ongoing narcotics
conspiracy, a team of federal agents stopped a green camper, driven by
Christopher Moscatiello, on the Massachusetts Turnpike near Bos
ton. 167 After arresting Moscatiello and impounding the camper, the
agents obtained a warrant and searched the vehicle. 168 In the vehicle
they discovered several bales of marijuana wrapped in burlap. Five
minutes after Moscatiello's arrest another team of federal agents fol
lowed a white Ford truck, driven by John Rooney, into the driveway
of a garage located on Sylvester Road in Boston. After arresting
Rooney, a confederate of Moscatiello's, the agents opened the rear
door of the vehicle and observed inside approximately sixty bales of
marijuana. 169 Based on these discoveries, the agents obtained a war
rant to search the garage. 170
Meanwhile, federal agents drove to a warehouse on D Street and
observed a man "pacing back and forth ... in front of the [warehouse]
lice officers reasonably rely upon an apparently valid warrant in conducting a
search, I am not at all confident that the exception unleashed today will remain so
confined. Indeed, the full impact of the Court's regrettable decisions will not be
felt until the Court attempts to extend this rule to situations in which the police
have conducted a warrantless search solely on the basis of their own judgment
about the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Id. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 918.
165. For a discussion of why such searches are objectively unreasonable, see supra
note 158 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 10 for a discussion of the procedural background of this case.
167. United States v. Murray, 771 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1985).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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... looking at traffic as it passed."171 After driving around the block,
the agents noticed that the man had disappeared. Those agents, joined
by another team of federal agents, surrounded the warehouse. They
then banged on the building's overhead doors as they announced their
identity as federal agents. 172 When there was no response from inside
the warehouse, the agents forcibly entered the building and observed a
number of bales of marijuana wrapped in burlap.173 After finding no
one in the warehouse the agents retreated and secured the building
from the outside. 174
In their application for a warrant to search the warehouse the
agents did not mention their forced entry into the building or the bales
of marijuana which they had seen in plain view. Instead, the agents
relied upon lawfully obtained information as their sole basis for ob
taining a warrant. 175
A magistrate issued a search warrant for the warehouse which the
agents executed approximately eight hours after their initial entry into
the building. 176 During their lawful search of the warehouse the
agents not only seized the bales of marijuana which they had seen ear
lier, but also "a red and a blue spiral notebook, tape dispensers, mark
ing pens, and marked pieces of tape" apparently used for labelling the
bales of marijuana. 177
In the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Moscatiello, Rooney, and three others-Carter, Murray and Barrett
were charged with various drug-related offenses. 178 The defendants
moved to suppress the evidence which the agents seized during their
searches of the two vehicles and the garage. In addition, Carter and
Murray moved to suppress all of the evidence which 'the agents seized
during their warranted search of the warehouse. The district court
denied all of the defendants' motions and the defendants appealed. 179
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the searches
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The agents relied upon information which their associates obtained during
their searches of the green camper and the white truck, which had occurred prior to the
warehouse entry. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 595-96.
178. In a five count indictment, the government charged Moscatiello, Murray,
Carter, Rooney and Barrett with possession and conspiracy to possess over one thousand
pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I), 841(b)(6), 846. Murray, 771
F.2d at 591.
179. Murray, 771 F.2d at 591-92.
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of the two vehicles were lawful under the automobile exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement. ISO The court also agreed
with the district court that the agents' lawful discovery of the mari
juana in these vehicles furnished probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant to search the garage. lSI The court of appeals, therefore, held
that all of the contraband which the agents seized during their
searches of the two vehicles and the garage could be admitted into
evidence. 182 The court then considered the admissibility of the evi
dence which the agents seized during their search of the warehouse
pursuant to the warrant.
On appeal, Murray and Carter challenged the district court's rul
ing that they lacked standing to contest the admissibility of the ware
house evidence. 183 They then urged the court of appeals to suppress
all of the evidence which the agents seized in the warehouse pursuant
to the warrant. The defendants claimed that the search warrant was
invalid because the agents had failed to mention in their warrant appli
cation their prior unlawful entry into the warehouse. 184 Alternatively,
the defendants urged the court of appeals to suppress all of the evi
dence in the warehouse which the agents observed in plain view with
out a warrant "as the direct product of a fourth amendment
violation."185 The government denied the defendants' assertions and
argued that exigent circumstances justified the agents' warrantless en
try into the warehouse. 186
After agreeing with the defendants' contention that they had
180. The automobile exception is described in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985). In Carney, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that warrantless searches of
automobiles are lawful when based upon probable cause. The Court asserted two justifica·
tions for the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement: the "ready mobility" of
the automobile and the reduced "expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile."
Id. at 390-91 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976».
In Murray, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that information
supplied by three informants as well as the "complex pattern of vehicular activity" that
occurred on the afternoon of the searches provided the agents with probable cause to be
lieve that the two vehicles were carrying contraband. Murray, 771 F.2d at 596-600. Thus,
the searches of these two vehicles were lawful. Id. at 600.
181. Murray, 771 F.2d at 600.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 601. The district court advanced two reasons for concluding that Murray
and Carter lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the warehouse searches.
First, the warehouse was owned by a corporation and not by the defendants in their indi
vidual capacities. Second, there was no evidence "that any portion of the warehouse was
set aside for the personal use of any defendant as corporate officer, employee or financial
backer." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 601-02.
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standing to contest the legality of the warehouse searches,187 the court
considered the government's assertion that exigent circumstances jus
tified the agents' warrantless search of the warehouse. The court re
called that under Archibald v. Mosel,188 warrantless searches are
lawful when law enforcement officials "have a reasonable perception
that exigent circumstances obtain."189 The court, however, was "loath
to conclude that exigent circumstances existed" because the district
court had not addressed this question. 190 Instead, the court concluded
that even if the agents' initial search of the warehouse was unlawful, it
would not suppress all of the evidence found in the building if the
agents obtained the evidence "through an independent, lawful·
source." 191
The court of appeals recalled that in Segura v. United States, 192
the Supreme Court applied the "independent source" rationale to ad
mit evidence that officers first obtained in an apartment pursuant to a
valid warrant even when those officers initially entered the apartment
unlawfully.193 The court, therefore, concluded that Segura required
the admission of the notebook, tape dispensers, marking pens and tape
that the agents first discovered in the warehouse pursuant to the war
rant. 194 The court rejected the defendants' claim that the search war
rant was invalid because the agents had failed to disclose their prior
warrantless search of the warehouse to the magistrate. The court rea
soned that "the mere omission of irrelevant facts from" a warrant affi
davit does not invalidate a warrant that is otherwise supported by
"overwhelming probable cause."195
The court of appeals then addressed the "harder question" of
whether to admit the bales of marijuana which the agents observed in
plain view during their unauthorized search of the warehouse.
187. The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that the defendants
lacked standing. The court observed that both Murray and Carter had a " 'legitimate ex
pectation of privacy in the area searched' " because they each had a "proprietary interest"
in the warehouse, stored personal property there, and were the only persons who had keys
to the building. Id. at 601 (quoting United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980».
188. 677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the facts of Archibald, see supra.
note 158.
189. Murray, 771 F.2d at 602.
190. Id.
19\. Id. (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920».
192. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). See supra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
193. Murray, 771 F.2d at 602-03 (citing Segura, 468 U.S. at 813-16).
194. Id. at 603 ("As for the evidence uncovered for the first time during the ware
house search conducted pursuant to the warrant, Segura is on all fours and we necessarily
affirm the denial of defendants' motion to suppress.").
195. Id.
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Although conceding that the Supreme Court had not addressed this
question in Segura, the court recalled Justice Stevens' assertion in that
case that "[t]he warrant provided an 'independent' justification for
seizing all the evidence in the apartment-that in plain view just as
much as the items that were concealed."196 The court reasoned that
application of this "independent justification" rationale in the present
case would be more defensible than in Segura because "agents entering
the [warehouse] found [it] to be deserted, and hence the possibility
seems nil that the evidence in plain view would or could have been
removed or destroyed before the second search" pursuant to the war
rant.\97 The court then observed that the Supreme Court "adhere[d]
to the independent justification analysis" in the "closely analogous sit- .
uation" of Williams II.198
The court of appeals concluded its discussion by noting the con
flict between its application of the "independent justification" analysis
to admit the prewarrant evidence and the exclusionary rule's deter
rence rationale:
Since the chief, and perhaps sole, rationale for the exclusionary rule
is to deter future violations of the fourth amendment, see Leon, 104
S. Ct. at 3412 (decided same day as Segura), arguably all evidence
first spied through illegal procedures must be suppressed, no matter
how 'inevitable' its later, legal discovery. But the reasoning in
Segura and, certainly, that in ... [Williams II], lead us to conclude
that the ... [prewarrant evidence] should not be suppressed. This is
as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery of the contra
band in plain view was totally irrelevant to the later securing of a
warrant and the successful search that ensued. 199
The court of appeals admitted the bales of marijuana, finding no
"causal link" between the agents' unlawful search of the warehouse
196. /d. .(quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 831 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting». The court's use of this quote to support admission of the prewarrant evidence
in Murray implies that the dissent in Segura endorsed the majority's independent source
analysis. However, Justice Stevens specifically rejected the majority's strictly causal ap
proach. See supra text accompanying notes 98- \OJ. Instead, Justice Stevens identifies the
"controlJing question [as) ... whether the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule
would be served or undermined by suppression of ... evidence." Segura, 468 U.S. at 836
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Murray, 771 F.2d at 603. Because the evidence in the warehouse would have
been available to the police even if they had complied with lawful procedures, the illegal
entry did not place them in a better position than they would have been in in the absence of
their illegality. This was Justice Stevens' major concern in Segura.
198. Murray, 771 F.2d at 603-04.
199. Id. at 604.
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and their subsequent, "lawful seizure of this evidence. 2oo
C.

A Proposal for Resolving Murray v. United States

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned that "the
logic of the majority's reasoning" in Segura compelled the admission
of theprewarrant evidence in Murray.201 According to the court, the
valid search warrant provided an "independent justification" for ad
mitting this evidence. 202 The court concluded, without analysis, that
this independent justification analysis was consistent with Williams
11.203 There are two flaws in the court's reasoning.
First, seizure of the narcotics pursuant to the valid warrant shows
that the agents could have avoided a constitutional challenge to their
conduct by obtaining this evidence originally through legal means.
Law enforcement officers should be discouraged from engaging in con
duct that objectively is unreasonable, such as failing to comply with
the requirement that they obtain a warrant before a search, whenever
practicable. 204
The Supreme Court's analysis in Leon supports suppression of
evidence observed during illegal, prewarrant searches. 205 In illegal,
200. Id.
201. Id. at 603.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 603-04.
204. The Supreme Court accepts the principle that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter not only "willful," but "negligent" and, therefore. objectively unreasonable
police conduct. For example, the Court has observed that:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of
such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers
... a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975». Cj
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 261 n.15 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (prime value of
exclusionary rule is as an encouragement to officers to act in "accord with the Fourth
Amendment").
205. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65. An argument asserted against adop
tion of the good faith exception in Leon was that the exception's availability necessarily
would "freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state." Leol/, 468 U.S. at 924. Be
cause a finding that an officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner would be disposi
tive of the exclusionary rule's applicability, courts never would have to determine whether
the officer committed a constitutional violation. See Leading Cases a/the 1983 Term, supra
note 160, at 117. Justice White responded to this argument by stressing that courts would
have the flexibility of first determining the existence of a constitutional violation before
addressing the good faith issue. Leol/, 468 U.S. at 924.
A similar argument can be made against adoption of an inevitable discovery approach
that allows the admission of prewarrant evidence on the basis of a valid search warrant.
Courts never would have to determine whether a warrantless search was lawful because the
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prewarrant searches, officers necessarily are acting in an objectively
unreasonable manner. 206 Because the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter objectively unreasonable conduct, suppression of evidence
observed during an illegal prewarrant search serves the deterrence ra
tionale and is, therefore, consistent with Leon.
In Griffin, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit implicitly
recognized that suppression of prewarrant evidence was necessary to
deter objectively unreasonable conduct. The court held that "absent
any of the narrowly limited exceptions ... to the search warrant re
quirement, police who believe they have probable cause to search can
not enter a home without a warrant merely because they plan
subsequently to get one."207 Thus, the court was unwilling to endorse
an inevitable discovery approach which would have given law enforce
ment officers carte blanche to undertake unreasonable searches in vio
lation of the exigent circumstances exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement. 208
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Segura, also stressed the importance
of the deterrence rationale. He reasoned that this rationale was
"plainly applicable" in Segura because the officers conducted the ille
gal prewarrant entry to ensure the preservation of incriminating evi
dence. 209 Therefore, he urged application of the exclusionary rule to
wipe out any advantage which accrued to the agents as a result of their
illegal prewarrant entry into and impoundment of the defendant's
apartment. 2\0
In Murray, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit improperly
failed to take the deterrence rationale into account when deciding to
admit the bales of marijuana under its "independent justification"
analysis. After finding the search warrant valid, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit should have determined whether suppression of
the bales of marijuana was necessary to discourage similar conduct in
future cases.
The second flaw in the court of appeals' analysis is the assertion
that Williams II is "closely analogous" to Murray, and, therefore, supofficers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in later obtaining a warrant. The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted this methodology in Murray. See supra text ac
companying note 191.
206. See supra note 158.
207. Griffin, 502 F.2d at 961.
208. For a brief discussion of the exigent circumstances exception and an explana
tion of why warrantless searches in violation of this exception are objectively unreasonable,
see supra note 158.
209. Segura, 468 U.S. at 836 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2\0. /d. at 837.
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ports admission of the bales of marijuana. Williams II is a factually
distinguishable case.
In Williams II, evidence of the location and condition of remains
was admissible because the girl's remains would have been obtained
through an independent investigation unrelated to the illegal conduct
of Detective Learning. In Murray, however, the government cannot
claim that the challenged evidence would have been obtained if in
dependent investigations were allowed to continue in the absence of
the illegal search. Instead, the agents who discovered the incriminat
ing evidence during the allegedly unlawful search were the same
agents who subsequently seized this evidence pursuant to the warrant.
In a case like Murray, therefore, the lawful discovery of prewarrant
evidence can never be deemed truly "inevitable." It is possible that
without the initial entry into the warehouse in which the agents saw
the contraband, the agents would not have sought the search
warrant.21 1
Law enforcement officers should be precluded from using a valid
warrant "in an effort to engage in after-the-fact repair of unlawful con
duct."212 If the initial search was unlawful in Murray, then suppres
sion of the prewarrant evidence is necessary to discourage agents from
failing to comply with the often cumbersome, but constitutionally re
quired procedures of the fourth amendment.
The district court did not determine whether the forced entry into
the warehouse was lawful because the officers had "a reasonable per
ception that exigent circumstances obtain[ed]."213 The Court of Ap
peals for the First Circuit did not reach this question, preferring
instead to rely upon its "independent justification" analysis to admit
the evidence. 214 Murray should be remanded to the district court.
The bales of marijuana should be admissible only if the district court
determines that the agents' initial entry was lawful because it was con
sistent with the objective reasonableness standard articulated in Archi
211. Although there was sufficient evidence for the warrant, the agents may not have
put together the evidence without first having seen the contraband.
It is also curious that the agents did not mention their discovery of the contraband in
their application for the warrant. If the agents had, in fact, entered the warehouse under
exigent circumstances, their discovery of the contraband would have provided excellent
probable cause for the warrant. Perhaps, subjectively, the agents did not view their con
duct as reasonable, and thus, decided not to mention their activity in the warrant
application.
212. Appel, supra note 60, at 114-15.
213. Murray, 771 F.2d at 602 (citing Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982)).
214. Id. at 602-04.
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bald v. Mosel. 215 If the district court determines otherwise, then the
prewarrant evidence should be suppressed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Murray v. United States, the United States Supreme Court will
address a question left unanswered in Segura: when is evidence first
seen during an unlawful entry and later seized pursuant to a valid
search warrant admissible?
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, applying the logic of
the majority's independent source analysis in Segura, reasoned that a
valid search warrant provides an "inevitable" independent basis for
admitting this evidence. If the Supreme Court adopts this approach in
Murray, the Court will ignore the observation it made in Segura that
suppression of prewarrant evidence is necessary to discourage war
rantless searches in the absence of exigent circumstances. It was this
concern for deterring unreasonable conduct which prompted the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Griffin and the Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit in Segura to suppress the prewarrant evi
dence at issue in those cases.
In Leon, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a principal
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable conduct. In
Murray, therefore, the Court should evince its unWillingness to sanc
tion unreasonable police conduct by endorsing an approach which is
consistent with the exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale. Instead of
admitting the prewarrant evidence under an inevitable discovery anal
ysis, the Court should remand Murray to the district court. Upon re
mand, the district court should determine whether the prewarrant
evidence is admissible because the officers harbored an objectively rea
sonable belief that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless en
try into the warehouse.
Gordon D. Quinn

215. 677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982). This is assuming that the court will not suppress the
prewarrant evidence because the agents could have obtained the evidence originally
through lawful means.

